The Aftermath of \u3ci\u3eMelendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts\u3c/i\u3e, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009)—Identifying the Analyst Who Can Satisfy Confrontation by Sullivan, Ryan
Nebraska Law Review 
Volume 89 Issue 3 Article 6 
3-2011 
The Aftermath of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 
2527 (2009)—Identifying the Analyst Who Can Satisfy 
Confrontation 
Ryan Sullivan 
University of Nebraska College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr 
Recommended Citation 
Ryan Sullivan, The Aftermath of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009)—Identifying the 
Analyst Who Can Satisfy Confrontation, 89 Neb. L. Rev. (2010) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol89/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-3DR\NEB304.txt unknown Seq: 1 15-MAR-11 9:41
Note*
The Aftermath of Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527
(2009)—Identifying the Analyst
Who Can Satisfy Confrontation
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562 R
II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564 R
A. Development of the Confrontation Clause Over the
Last 30 Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564 R
B. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 566 R
1. Facts and Procedural Posture of the Case . . . . . . 566 R
2. Discussion and Holding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567 R
3. The Majority’s Response to Arguments Opposing
Its Ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568 R
i. Analyst Reports are Accusatory . . . . . . . . . . . . 568 R
ii. The Confrontation Clause Extends Beyond
the “Conventional Witness” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569 R
iii. Analyst Reports Are Not Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . 569 R
iv. The Business Records Exception Does Not
Apply to Analyst Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570 R
v. The Right to Subpoena Is Not Enough . . . . . . 571 R
vi. Requiring Analyst Testimony Will Not
Cripple the Justice System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572 R
III. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574 R
A. The Unresolved Issue: Who Must Testify? . . . . . . . . . . 574 R
B. Resolving the Issue Through Legislative Action . . . . 578 R
1. Characteristics of the “Testifying Analyst” . . . . . . 580 R
2. Surrogate Testimony Will Not Satisfy
Confrontation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581 R
3. Examination of Identifying Language in Ohio
Notice-and-Demand Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583 R
IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585 R
 Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Ryan Sullivan, J.D., 2010, University of Nebraska College of Law; M.S., 2005,
California University of Pennsylvania; B.S., 2002, Colorado State University.
561
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-3DR\NEB304.txt unknown Seq: 2 15-MAR-11 9:41
562 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:561
I. INTRODUCTION
A citizen’s ability to confront his or her accuser is a right so funda-
mental that it was inscribed in the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.1  This “Confrontation Clause” has been a topic of
great debate in recent decades.  The broad language of the Clause
spawns many questions of interpretation.  The question at the core of
most Confrontation Clause issues has been which out-of-court state-
ments violate the Clause.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly addressed
concerns over the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.  The
most significant decision was Crawford v. Washington,2 where the
Court determined that the Clause prohibited the admission of state-
ments that were “testimonial,” regardless of their indicia of reliabil-
ity.3  Although the Court did not expressly define “testimonial,”4 it did
provide some examples in Crawford and in subsequent decisions.  The
list of testimonial statements identified by the Court included sworn
statements made to the police,5 statements made to 911 operators,6
affidavits,7 and other “prior testimony that the defendant was unable
to cross-examine.”8  The Court’s findings made clear that most out-of-
court statements made to law enforcement are inadmissible without
affording the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the declar-
ant.9  With this issue resolved, the next question to emerge was
whether certified analyst reports would bear the same fate.  For years,
prosecutors have freely admitted the contents of certified analyst re-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).  This fundamen-
tal right to confrontation can be traced as far back as Roman law where Roman
governor Porcius Festus stated, “It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver
any man to destruction before the accused meets the accusers face to face, and
has opportunity to answer for himself concerning the charges against him.” Acts
of the Apostles 25:16.
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. Under the “testimonial” standard of Crawford, if the out-of-court statement is
deemed testimonial, the statement is inadmissible unless the witness is unavail-
able and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. See id. at 59.
Prior to Crawford, reliability was the standard for determining whether certain
out-of-court statements violated the Confrontation Clause. See Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Under the Roberts “indicia of reliability” standard, the evidence satisfied confron-
tation requirements if it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or pos-
sessed “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. at 66.
4. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’ ”).
5. Id. at 52.
6. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006).
7. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 53; Davis, 547 U.S. at 826.
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ports as prima facie evidence against defendants to prove the composi-
tion, weight, or quantity of an illegal substance.10  Many jurisdictions
allowed such admissions without providing the defendant an opportu-
nity to cross-examine the analyst who prepared the report.11  After
Crawford, defense attorneys challenged such admissions, arguing that
analyst reports were “testimonial.”  They took the position that admit-
ting the lab reports would violate the Confrontation Clause unless the
prosecution presented the analyst for cross-examination.12
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Mas-
sachusetts,13 the latest victory for proponents of a broader application
of the Confrontation Clause.  In Melendez-Diaz, the Court examined a
Massachusetts law14 which authorized the admission of certified ana-
lyst reports as prima facie evidence against the accused.15  The Su-
preme Court found that this statute unconstitutionally deprived the
defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.16  The
Court concluded that analyst reports are “testimonial” under Craw-
ford and therefore require the live testimony of the analyst who per-
formed the tests.17  Although the Court found the Massachusetts law
unconstitutional, it approved a handful of other statutes which pro-
vide for the admission of analyst reports as prima facie evidence.18
Unlike the Massachusetts law, however, these “notice-and-demand”19
statutes contain additional language requiring the prosecution to give
notice to the defendant of its intent to admit the reports and grant the
defendant the right to demand the live testimony of the analyst pre-
paring the report.20  While the Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz was a
proper application of Crawford—and provides courts and legislatures
with additional guidance as to the scope of the Confrontation Clause—
10. Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 478 (2006)
(“The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States authorize the state to
prove its forensic allegations by relying upon a forensic certificate in lieu of live
testimony.”) (footnote omitted).
11. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-254 (2009); D.C. CODE § 48-905.06 (Lexis-
Nexis 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-43 (LEXIS through Jan. 2009 Sess.).
12. Thomas F. Burke III, The Test Results Said What? The Post-Crawford Admissi-
bility of Hearsay Forensic Evidence, 53 S.D. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2008).
13. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
14. MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13 (2009).
15. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.
16. Although the Massachusetts statute granted the defendant the ability to sub-
poena the analyst, the Court found this unconstitutionally shifted the burden to
the defendant to offer adverse witnesses for cross-examination. Id. at 2540.
17. Id. at 2532 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).
18. Id. at 2541 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §35-3-154.1 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2925.51(C) (West 2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41, § 4 (West
2005)).
19. These statutes are also known as “waiver statutes” or “forensic ipse dixit stat-
utes.”  Burke III, supra note 12, at 24.
20. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §35-3-154.1 (2006).
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the Court failed to clearly identify who must testify in order to admit
the contents of the lab report.  This Note proposes that jurisdictions
adopt legislation which identifies a single analyst whose testimony
would satisfy confrontation requirements for admitting the entire con-
tents of the lab report.
This Note begins by briefly exploring the development of the Con-
frontation Clause over the last thirty years, followed by a discussion of
the holding in Melendez-Diaz and a summary of the Court’s responses
to arguments made in opposition to its ruling.  Part III begins by iden-
tifying a significant issue on which the Court’s ruling left inadequate
guidance: Who must testify in order to admit the contents of the ana-
lyst report?21  Oftentimes, several technicians are involved in the
analysis of a single sample, yet Melendez-Dias fails to identify which
of these analysts alone would satisfy confrontation requirements,
leaving open the possibility that multiple analysts must testify in or-
der to admit all the contents of a lab report.  Section III.B proposes
and discusses how jurisdictions can take legislative action in order to
preemptively resolve this issue. Melendez-Diaz does not require the
testimony of every analyst involved in the testing of the substance.  In
fact, the testimony of a single analyst may be sufficient as long as this
analyst participated in the testing of the substance and possesses ade-
quate knowledge regarding the equipment used and the methods em-
ployed.  This Note proposes that jurisdictions adopt statutory
language identifying the characteristics of this “testifying analyst,”
which would allow for the admission of the lab report through the tes-
timony of a single analyst.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Confrontation Clause Over the Last
Thirty Years
Three decades ago, in Ohio v. Roberts,22 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of an
unavailable witness’s statement against a criminal defendant if the
statement bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”23  The Court found
that one could infer reliability in cases where the statement falls
“within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”24  The Court also found
reliability where the evidence contained “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.”25  Although the Court never fully defined these
guarantees, it later ruled in Idaho v. Wright that “to be admissible
21. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
22. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
23. Id. at 66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a
defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent
trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.”26  That is,
the statement must be shown to be trustworthy on its own—no cor-
roborating evidence could be admitted to prove the trustworthiness of
the statement.  The standard established by Ohio v. Roberts remained
for nearly thirty years, and during this time courts and legislatures
developed rules and adopted criteria to comply with this “reliability”
standard.  In 2004, with seven of the nine Roberts Court Justices no
longer serving,27 the Supreme Court overruled its “reliability” stan-
dard and replaced it with a broader, yet equally unclear “testimonial”
standard.28
In Crawford v. Washington, the court ruled that the Confrontation
Clause applied to all “testimonial” statements.29  Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Scalia found that history clearly demonstrated that the
Confrontation Clause was intended to exclude ex parte testimony from
“‘witnesses’” against the accused—“those who ‘bear testimony.’”30
Justice Scalia further opined that “the Framers would not have al-
lowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”31  Justice Scalia con-
cluded that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is ob-
viously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty.”  Of course, this raised the issue of
which statements qualified as testimonial.  The Crawford Court failed
to provide a user-friendly, bright-line definition of “testimonial,”32 but
it did identify what it called a “core class” of testimonial statements,
“such as affidavits, custodial examinations . . . or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially.”33
Two years later, the Court provided further guidance in Davis v.
Washington.34  There, the Court labeled certain portions of a 911 tele-
phone recording testimonial, and it ruled that admitting those por-
tions would violate the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation
26. 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990).
27. Only Justice Stevens and Justice Rehnquist remained.
28. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (finding that the Rob-
erts standard unconstitutionally allowed the admission of testimonial statements
that the Confrontation Clause clearly intended to exclude).
29. Id. at 51.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 53–54.
32. David A. Doellman, Comment, The Crawford Confusion Marches On: The Con-
frontation Clause and Hearsay Laboratory Drug Reports, 73 MO. L. REV. 583, 604
(2008).
33. Id. at 51.
34. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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Clause.35  In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that an out-of-
court statement is testimonial when its primary purpose is “to estab-
lish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecu-
tion.”36  The Court further held that the statement is “nontestimonial
when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”37
Davis was helpful in quashing speculation over whether certain
sworn statements to police, taped interrogations, and other out-of-
court statements made to law enforcement officers were testimonial.
Of course, Davis by no means signaled the end of the Court’s ongoing
task of interpreting the scope of the Confrontation Clause.  Appeals
arising from Confrontation Clause issues continued to pour in, de-
manding the Court’s attention.38  The most recent Confrontation
Clause case heard by the Supreme Court was Melendez-Diaz v. Mas-
sachusetts,39 where the Court added certified analyst reports to the
ever-expanding “core class” of testimonial statements.40
B. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
1. Facts and Procedural Posture of the Case
Luis Melendez-Diaz and two other suspects were arrested while
allegedly dealing cocaine in a K-Mart parking lot in Boston, Massa-
chusetts.41  While transporting the three detainees to the police sta-
tion, the police officers observed them fidgeting and “making furtive
movements” and felt them kicking the back of the front seats.42  After
dropping the three men off at the police station, the officers searched
the back seat of the police car and found nineteen small plastic bags
containing a white substance “hidden in the partition between the
front and back seats.”43  The police officers submitted the bags to the
state laboratory for analysis.44  Following the analysis, the state labo-
ratory provided the prosecution with certificates of analysis which de-
scribed the weight of the seized bags and identified the substance as
35. Id. at 830.
36. Id. at 822.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); State v. Romero, 156 P.3d 694
(N.M. 2007), cert. dismissed, 552 U.S. 1135 (2008).
39. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
40. Id. at 2532.
41. Id. at 2530.
42. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL 2189152, at *2 (Mass.
App. Ct. July 31, 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 874
N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007) (unpublished table decision), cert. granted, 552 U.S.
1256 (2008) (mem.), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
43. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.
44. Id.
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cocaine.45  Melendez-Diaz was subsequently charged with distributing
and trafficking cocaine.46  As permitted by Massachusetts law,47 the
certificates containing the results of the analysis were sworn before a
notary public and admitted as prima facie evidence against Melendez-
Diaz.48  Melendez-Diaz objected to the admission of the reports, argu-
ing that under Crawford, he had a right to confront the analyst creat-
ing the reports.49  The trial court disagreed.50
After a jury found him guilty on both counts, Melendez-Diaz ap-
pealed, arguing that the admission of the certified lab reports violated
his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.51
Melendez-Diaz characterized the lab analysis as testimonial and ar-
gued that the Court’s ruling in Crawford required the live testimony
of the technician.52  The Commonwealth argued that under Common-
wealth v. Verde,53 these lab reports were not testimonial.54  Relying
on this decision, the Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected Melendez-
Diaz’s claims in an unpublished opinion, finding they were without
merit.55  The Massachusetts Supreme Court also denied his appeal.56
However, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2008
to resolve the admissibility of certified analyst reports,57 and it issued
its opinion in June 2009.
2. Discussion and Holding
In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitution-
ality of admitting certified analyst reports as prima facie evidence
against the defendant.  Melendez-Diaz took the stance that admitting
these reports absent live testimony from the certifying analyst was
45. Id. at 2531.
46. Id. at 2530.
47. MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13 (2009).
48. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Brief and Record Appendix for the Defendant–Appellant Luis Melendez-Diaz on
Appeal from the Suffolk Superior Court at 38, Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz,
69 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 (2007) (No. 05-P-1213), 2006 WL 5003338, at *38.
52. Id. at 38–39.
53. 827 N.E.2d 710, 705–06 (Mass. 2005).
54. Brief for the Commonwealth on Appeal from a Judgment of the Suffolk Superior
Court at 26, Melendez-Diaz, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 (No. 05-P-1213), 2006 WL
2189352, at *26.
55. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL 2189152, at *4 n.3
(Mass. App. Ct. July 31, 2007), appeal denied, 874 N.E. 2d 407 (Mass. 2007) (un-
published table decision), cert. granted, 552 U.S. 1256 (2008) (mem.), rev’d, 129 S.
Ct. 2527 (2009).
56. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007) (unpublished ta-
ble decision).
57. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 552 U.S. 1256 (2008) (mem.).
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inconsistent with the Court’s holding in Crawford.58  Massachusetts59
(and eventually the dissent60) argued for a more narrow reading of
Crawford—one that made the Confrontation Clause applicable only to
“traditional” witness testimony.  Ultimately, a majority of the Court
concluded that certified analyst reports clearly fell within the “class of
testimonial statements covered by the Confrontation Clause.”61  The
certificates, the Court found, were essentially affidavits by another
name.62  The certificates were “functionally identical to live, in-court
testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examina-
tion.’”63  Applying the rule established in Crawford,64 the Court held
that “the analysts’ affidavits were testimonial statements, and the
analysts were ‘witnesses’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”65
The Court concluded that “absent a showing that the analysts were
unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportu-
nity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to ‘be confronted
with’ the analyst at trial.”66
3. The Majority’s Response to Arguments Opposing Its Ruling
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia addressed the various ar-
guments proffered in opposition to the Court’s ruling.  The majority’s
conclusions in response to each of these arguments are discussed in
turn below.
i. Analyst Reports are Accusatory
In its brief, Massachusetts first argued that analyst reports are not
subject to confrontation because they are not “accusatory.”67  In re-
sponse, the Court cited Sixth Amendment language guaranteeing the
right “ ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ”68  Where the
58. Brief for Petitioner at 10–11, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527
(2009) (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 2468543, at *10–11 (citing Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
59. Brief for Respondent at 28, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591), 2008 WL
4103864, at *28 (“Drug analysis certificates are non-testimonial because they do
not involve, and are not analogous to, ex parte examinations of witnesses—the
principal evil the Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent.”).
60. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no evidence
that the Framers understood the Clause to extend to unconventional witnesses.”).
61. Id. at 2531–32 (majority opinion).
62. Id. at 2532.
63. Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
64. Crawford stands for the rule that statements of a witness who did not appear at
trial are inadmissible “unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant
had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.
65. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
66. Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).
67. Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 10.
68. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
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purpose of the analysis was to prove facts necessary for the conviction
of the defendant, the contents of the analyst report were clearly
against the defendant.69
The Court contrasted the Confrontation Clause, which guarantees
the right of the defendant to be confronted with witnesses “against
him,” with the adjacent Compulsory Process Clause, which guaran-
tees a defendant the right to call witnesses “in his favor.”70  Thus, the
Sixth Amendment identifies “two classes of witnesses—those against
the defendant and those in his favor.  The prosecution must produce
the former; the defendant may call the latter.”71
ii. The Confrontation Clause Extends Beyond the
“Conventional Witness”
Massachusetts and the dissent argued that analysts are not the
“conventional witnesses” contemplated by drafters of the Clause and
that the certified reports do not encompass the “principal evil the Con-
frontation Clause was designed to prevent.”72  Indeed, Justice Ken-
nedy, writing for the dissent, concluded that the “Framers were
concerned with a typical witness—one who perceived an event that
gave rise to a personal belief in some aspect of the defendant’s guilt.”73
However, the majority rejected this assertion, finding no support for
the contention that witnesses who testify regarding facts other than
those observed at the crime scene are exempt from the Clause.74
Under the dissent’s theory, all “expert witnesses—a hardly ‘unconven-
tional’ class of witnesses”—would be exempt.75  The Court also found
the absence of interrogation was irrelevant.76
iii. Analyst Reports Are Not Neutral
Massachusetts also argued that concerns addressed by the Con-
frontation Clause are inapplicable to analysts because the contents of
the certified analyst report “reflect the results of neutral, scientific
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2534 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
71. Id. (footnote omitted).
72. Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 28–31; see Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at
2551–52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2535 (majority opinion) (“The dissent provides no authority for this particu-
lar limitation of the type of witnesses subject to confrontation.  Nor is it conceiva-
ble that all witnesses who fit this description would be outside the scope of the
Confrontation Clause.”).
75. Id.
76. Id. (“ ‘[T]he Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination vol-
unteered testimony or answer to open-ended questions than they were to exempt
answers to detailed interrogation.”’ (quoting Davis v. Washington 547 U.S. 813,
822 n.1 (2006))).
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testing performed by government officials pursuant to a statutory
duty.”77  Further, Massachusetts explained, “the testing results re-
corded on the certificates speak for themselves; unlike witness ac-
counts, they cannot be . . . ‘dress[ed] up’ by police officers passing
along hearsay testimony.”78
However, the majority dismissed this “neutrality” argument as “lit-
tle more than an invitation to return to our overruled decision in Rob-
erts.”79  The Court reiterated its conclusion in Crawford—that the
goal of the Confrontation Clause was to “ensure reliability of evi-
dence,” but the Court noted that “it is a procedural rather than a sub-
stantive guarantee.  It commands, not that the evidence be reliable,
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in
the crucible of cross-examination.’”80  The Court found that confronta-
tion of analysts is necessary to reduce false testimony81 and expose an
analyst’s potential “lack of proper training or deficiency in judg-
ment.”82  Further, the Court pointed out that “[a]t least some . . .
methodology requires the exercise of judgment and presents a risk of
error that might be explored on cross-examination.”83 The Court’s con-
clusions were likely fueled by an amicus curiae brief describing nu-
merous accounts of crime lab scandals, wrongful convictions, dry-
labbing, bad science, and other forensic errors that in many cases
could have been exposed during proper cross-examination, if
allowed.84
iv. The Business Records Exception Does Not Apply to
Analyst Reports
Massachusetts contended that analyst reports are similar to “busi-
ness records generally admissible at common law because they are
prepared in the ordinary course of the laboratory’s day-to-day busi-
77. Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 29.
78. Id. at 30 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373).
79. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (citing Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
Under the overruled Roberts standard, if the out-of-court statement was suffi-
ciently reliable, it could be admitted as evidence against the accused without
meeting confrontation requirements. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
80. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004)).
81. Id. at 2536–37 (“Like the eyewitness who has fabricated his account to the police,
the analyst who provides false results may, under oath in open court, reconsider
his false testimony.”).
82. Id. at 2537.
83. Id.
84. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network in Support
of Petitioner, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 2550614.  In
the majority opinion, Justice Scalia commented extensively on the recently publi-
cized unreliability of forensic testing and the need for cross-examination to ex-
pose inherent fraud, fabrication, and incompetence. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at
2536–38.
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ness.”85  The majority rejected this argument and concluded that the
business records exception does not apply to analyst reports because,
although they were kept in the regular course of business, they were
produced with the intention to become evidence at a trial—a purpose
which removes the evidence from the business records exception.86
The Court also rejected the dissent’s parallel between an analyst’s
report and a clerk’s certificate authenticating an official record, which
does not require confrontation.87  The evidentiary purpose of the
clerk’s certificate is to “authenticate or provide a copy of an otherwise
admissible record,” whereas the purpose of a certified analyst report is
to “create a record for the sole purpose of providing evidence against a
defendant.”88  On this same principle, a clerk providing a certificate
“attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular rele-
vant record and failed to find it,” is subject to confrontation.89  Like
the testimony of an analyst, the clerk’s statement here “would serve as
substantive evidence against the defendant whose guilt depended on
the nonexistence of the record.”90
v. The Right to Subpoena Is Not Enough
Under Massachusetts law, when the prosecution offers a certified
analyst report as evidence at trial, the defendant has the ability to
subpoena the analyst to appear at trial.91  Further, the law “ensures
that a defendant retains the right to cross-examine the analyst in the
same manner as if he had been called by the prosecution.”92  Massa-
chusetts argued that this ability to subpoena the analyst satisfies con-
frontation requirements.93  The majority, however, refused to equate
the ability to subpoena with the right to confront.94  Unlike the rights
provided by the Confrontation Clause, provisions merely providing the
defendant with the right to subpoena are “of no use to the defendant
when the witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear.”95  The
Court concluded that “the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on
85. Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 11 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 56 (2004)).
86. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538.
87. Id. at 2538–39.
88. Id. at 2539.
89. Id. (citing People v. Bromwhich, 93 N.E. 933, 934 (N.Y. 1911)).
90. Id.
91. MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13 (2009).
92. Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 64–65 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111,
§ 13).
93. Id. at 55–58, 64–65.
94. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009).
95. Id. (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 820 (2006)).
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the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring
those adverse witnesses into court.”96
vi. Requiring Analyst Testimony Will Not Cripple the Justice
System
The dissent warns that the Court’s ruling in Melendez-Diaz will
result in uncertainty, disruption, and “heavy societal costs.”97  Simi-
larly, Massachusetts cautioned that the majority’s interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause “would result in a significant waste of public
resources, with no apparent gain in the truth-seeking function.”98
Massachusetts also argued that such an application of the Confronta-
tion Clause “would violate the fundamental principle that ‘the rights
of the public [in the prosecution of crime] shall not be wholly sacrificed
in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the ac-
cused.’”99  Similarly, the National District Attorneys Association, in
its amicus brief in support of Massachusetts, expressed concern that
the position advocated by Melendez-Diaz would result in a decrease in
guilty pleas100 and delays in the administration of justice.101
Nevertheless, the Court determined that these fears were un-
founded, in part because they were based on exaggerated predic-
tions102 of the frequency with which analysts would be called to
testify.103  The Court found that the projected number of required an-
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2547, 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
98. Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 59–60.
99. Id. at 60 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)); see also
State v. Crow, 974 P.2d 100, 111 (Kan. 1999) (“[T]he public has a significant in-
terest in avoiding the unnecessary expense of insuring the presence of laboratory
technicians at trials where the content of their testimony will not be challenged
by defendants.”), overruled by State v. Laturner, 218 P.3d 23 (Kan. 2009), cited in
Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 60.
100. Brief of Amici Curiae the National District Attorneys Ass’n et al. in Support of
Respondent at 17, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 4185393
at *17.
101. Id. at 15.
102. See id. (“[R]equiring live testimony in each and every drug-related case would
cause significant delays in the administration of justice . . . .”); see also Melendez-
Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“For example, the district at-
torney in Philadelphia prosecuted 25,000 drug crimes in 2007.  Assuming that
number remains the same, and assuming that 95% of the cases end in a plea
bargain, each of the city’s 18 analysts will be required to testify in more than 69
trials next year.” (citations omitted)).  In calculating this result, however, Justice
Kennedy makes the unrealistic assumption that all drug cases that do not result
in a plea will require the in-court testimony of the analyst. See Brief for Respon-
dent, supra note 59, at 59 (“Petitioner’s rigid interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause would establish a categorical rule requiring live testimony in every case
where drug analysis is performed . . . .”).
103. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (“We also doubt the accuracy of the respon-
dent’s dire predictions.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-3DR\NEB304.txt unknown Seq: 13 15-MAR-11 9:41
2011] IDENTIFYING THE ANALYST 573
alyst appearances proposed by the dissent, respondent, and various
amicus briefs in support of respondent’s position all relied on false as-
sumptions: namely that since every drug prosecution will involve ana-
lyst certificates, no defendant will stipulate to the nature of the
substance, and every defendant will object to the evidence or demand
the appearance of the analyst.104
Bolstering the Court’s conclusion that the judicial system would
survive its ruling is the fact that several jurisdictions have already
adopted this rule, and each has avoided the significant negative ef-
fects about which the dissent warned.105  As the Court pointed out,
even in Massachusetts “a defendant may subpoena the analyst to ap-
pear at trial, and yet there is no indication that obstructionist defend-
ants are abusing the privilege.”106
Next, the Court directed attention to certain statutes that the dis-
sent believed would be invalidated by the Court’s decision or other-
wise made ineffective by the ruling.107  On the contrary, the Court
held that notice-and-demand statutes do not violate the Confrontation
Clause where, unlike the Massachusetts statute, they do not shift the
state’s burden of satisfying the Confrontation Clause to the defen-
dant.108  Although these statutes allow for the admission of analyst
certificates as prima facie evidence109 and procedurally limit the de-
fendant’s ability to confront the analyst,110 they nonetheless satisfy
the Confrontation Clause by providing the defendant a right to de-
mand the live testimony of the analyst.111  The Court found that “[t]he
defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause
objection; notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time within
which he must do so.”112
104. Id. at 2540 n.10.
105. Id. at 2540–41 (“Despite these widespread practices, there is no evidence that the
criminal justice system has ground to a halt in States that, in one way or another,
empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst’s appearance at trial.”).
106. Id. at 2541 (citation omitted).
107. Id. (addressing the dissent’s remarks concerning the potential invalidation of
state “burden-shifting statutes”).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN., § 35-3-154.1(a) (2006) (“A copy of a report of the meth-
ods and findings of any examination or analysis conducted [by a state employed
or contracted analyst] . . . is prima-facie evidence in court proceedings in this
state of the facts contained therein.”).
110. See Metzger, supra note 10, at 482 n.22, 517 (“The demand must typically be filed
within a specified time after the receipt of notice or before the commencement of
trial. . . . [F]ailure to demand that the State prove its case by live witnesses for-
ever forecloses the defendant from confronting and cross-examining crucial State
witnesses.”).
111. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(C) (West 2006) (“The report shall not be
prima-facie evidence . . . if the accused . . . demands the testimony of the person
signing the report . . . .”).
112. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Unresolved Issue: Who Must Testify?
Although the Court correctly determined that a forensic analyst’s
lab report prepared for use in a criminal prosecution is “testimonial”
and is therefore subject to the demands of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause, the ruling left unresolved several issues that
should be addressed by state legislative action.
Following Melendez-Diaz, the law is now clear that a defendant
has a right to confront the analyst—and thus the practice of admitting
certified lab reports as prima facie evidence without also granting the
right to confront is no longer an option for prosecutors.  The Court did
not make clear, however, whose live testimony will satisfy the de-
mands of the Confrontation Clause.  In other words, who must the
prosecution present for cross-examination, if demanded, in order to
admit the contents of the analyst report?  Writing for the dissent, Jus-
tice Kennedy pointed out that “[t]here is no accepted definition of ana-
lyst,”113 and the majority’s ruling could be read to require the
testimony of all those participating in the analysis.114  In response,
the majority explained that the rules governing chain of custody are
applicable here, and these rules generally rebut the dissent’s concerns
that “everyone” must testify.115  In particular, the Court cited United
States v. Lott,116 where the Seventh Circuit held that “the government
need not prove a perfect chain of custody for evidence to be admitted
at trial; gaps in the chain normally go to the weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility.”117  Further, the Court implied that the
testimony of those maintaining and calibrating the testing equipment
likely would not be necessary for confrontation purposes.118  Although
the Court’s remarks narrowed the scope of who must testify in order to
meet Sixth Amendment demands,119 the issue remains: Who must
testify?
113. Id. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2544–45.  For example, the dissent proffers a hypothetical substance analy-
sis involving four people: two analysts, an independent contractor who calibrated
the testing equipment, and a laboratory director who certified that his subordi-
nates followed proper procedure.  Accordingly, the dissent cautioned that “it is
not all evident which of these four persons is the analyst to be confronted under
the rule the Court announces today.” Id. at 2544.
115. Id. at 2532 n.1 (majority opinion).
116. 854 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1988).
117. Id. at 250 (citing United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Lampson, 627 F.2d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 1980)).
118. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1 (“[W]e do not hold . . . that anyone whose
testimony may be relevant in establishing the . . . accuracy of the testing device
must [testify] . . . .  Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of
equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records.”).
119. Id. (stating that not “everyone who laid hands on the evidence must be called”).
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Chain of custody rules govern who must testify in order to admit
tangible evidence, but they are not similarly applicable in determining
whose testimony is required to admit the contents of a lab report.  In
cases involving tangible evidence, the prosecution determines whose
testimony best establishes chain of custody and then produces that
witness for cross-examination.120  Additional testimony may be war-
ranted to establish chain of custody or authenticity of the evidence,121
but it is not required by the Confrontation Clause.122  The Clause does
not require the testimony of a particular witness; it merely requires
that “what testimony is introduced must . . . be introduced live.”123
Only when the prosecution attempts to enter testimony through out-
of-court statements does a confrontation issue arise.  Hence, chain of
custody and authenticity do not pose confrontation issues because
they traditionally do not involve out-of-court statements.  In contrast,
lab reports are themselves out-of-court statements made by the ana-
lyst who prepared them.  In trial, these out-of-court statements would
be offered as evidence against the accused and, therefore, are subject
to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
The Court “tempered the most extreme concerns of critics over the
scope of its ruling” by insisting that not all individuals involved in the
testing process need to testify.124  However, the Court’s ruling only
removes from the list those involved in the “chain of custody, authen-
ticity of the sample, and accuracy of the testing device.”125  In short,
the Court provided a list of who does not need to testify, but it failed to
provide a clear description of who must testify.  Unfortunately, chain
of custody rules provide no guidance to a trial judge faced with deter-
mining which analyst must testify.  Compare the following two hy-
potheticals, one involving chain of custody of tangible evidence and
the other involving the process of analyzing a seized substance.
Chain of Custody.  Officer A finds a pistol on the floor board of
the defendant’s car during a lawful search.  Officer A remits this pistol
to the evidence clerk at the police station.  Officer B checks out the
pistol on the day of trial and delivers it to the bailiff.
At trial, the prosecution calls Officer A, who testifies to the location
of the pistol when it was found and to the fact that he delivered it to
the evidence clerk for processing.  In most cases, this will be enough to
120. Cf. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 180–81 (7th ed. 2007).
121. See id. at 183–85 (providing examples of testimony necessary to establish chain of
custody and authenticity of evidence).
122. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1 (implying that the Confrontation Clause
does not require the testimony of all those involved in the chain of custody).
123. Id.
124. Bennett L. Gershman, Confronting Scientific Reports Under Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 29 PACE L. REV. 479, 497–98 (2009).
125. Id.
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lay adequate foundation to admit the pistol as evidence in trial.126
The defendant will have the ability to cross-examine Officer A as to
the events surrounding the discovery of the weapon, the standard pro-
cedure for remitting evidence to the evidence clerk, and the depart-
ment’s policies for storage and handling of evidence.  The gaps left in
the chain of custody go to the weight of the evidence, e.g., the jury may
determine that the failure to provide testimony of the evidence clerk
or Officer B leaves doubt as to whether the pistol in court is the same
one found in the defendant’s car.  The testimony of the evidence clerk
and Officer B are not required to satisfy the Confrontation Clause for
the same reason the Clause does not require the testimony of a clerk
authenticating an official record.127  Like the clerk authenticating an
official record, neither the evidence clerk nor Officer B “create a record
for the sole purpose of providing evidence against the defendant.”128
Consequently, in this scenario, no confrontation issues arise because
no out-of-court statements or records are being offered against the ac-
cused.  However, more complex confrontation issues do arise in the
context of analyzing a controlled substance.
Substance Analysis.  Officer A finds a bag of white substance on
the floor board of the defendant’s car during a lawful search.  Officer A
remits this substance to the State Lab for analysis.  Lab Employee
checks the substance into the lab and assigns it to Analyst 1 for test-
ing.  Analyst 1 retrieves the substance and conducts the first stage of
analysis: determining the weight and volume of the contents of the
bag.  Analyst 1 then passes the substance to Analyst 2, who prepares
it for testing and places it in the gas chromatograph.129  Analyst 3
retrieves the printout from the testing machine and interprets the re-
sults.  Analyst 4, who manages the lab, but played no role in the anal-
ysis, signs a prepared analyst report to be used as evidence at trial.
Prior to the testing of the substance, the gas chromatograph was in-
spected and calibrated by Technician.
126. Foundation for the admission of a piece of tangible evidence may be properly es-
tablished through the testimony of a single witness where the witness can testify
that “the evidence fairly and accurately depicts what it purports to depict and
that it will be helpful to the witness in explaining his or her testimony.”  23 C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 1141 (2009) (quoting Andrews v. State, 811 A.2d 282, 293 (Md.
2002)).
127. See supra subsection II.B.3.d.
128. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539.
129. The gas chromatograph (GC) is an instrument that separates the compo-
nents of the mixture (gases) so that each compound can be identified.
The GC operates on the theory that, under controlled conditions, differ-
ent chemical compounds in a mixture will separate in the GC column at
different rates. This separation is how the compounds are identified by
the GC. The amount of the chemical present can also be determined by
this process, using a mathematical formula.
Lawrence E. Wines, Non-Breath Chemical Testing, in UNDERSTANDING DUI SCI-
ENTIFIC EVIDENCE 317, 338 (Lawrence E. Wines et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
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At trial, the prosecution would likely call Officer A to testify as to
the location of the bag of substance found, and the prosecution would
seek to admit the certified analyst report as prima facie evidence of
the contents of substance.  If the defendant objects to the admission of
the report and exercises his right to live testimony, the trial court
must determine whose testimony will satisfy the Confrontation
Clause.  Because chain-of-custody goes to the weight of the evidence
and is not subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, the
testimony of Lab Employee is not required.130  Further, any testimony
from Technician used to prove the accuracy of the gas chomatograph
may likely be submitted via affidavit.131  Yet, among Analysts 1, 2, 3
and 4, whose testimony can satisfy the Confrontation Clause as to the
entire contents of the report?  If the prosecution calls Analyst 1—who
can only testify as to the weight and volume of the substance—the
defendant will be denied the ability to cross-examine the witness testi-
fying as to its chemical composition.  Under Melendez-Diaz, this likely
would prevent the admission of this portion of the report.  If the prose-
cution calls only Analyst 2 or Analyst 3, then the part of the report
indicating weight and volume may be inadmissible.  It is also clear
after Davis,132 and even more certain after Melendez-Diaz,133 that
Analyst 4 could not testify to the contents of the report because he had
no firsthand knowledge of the data contained therein.134  Further, un-
like Lab Employee, the analysts “create[d] a record” to be used against
the defendant at trial.135
Melendez-Diaz provides guidance in reducing the class of partici-
pants who must testify in order to admit the contents of a lab report,
130. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.
131. Id.
132. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (holding that a testifying police
officer is not permitted to relay out-of court statements of a non-testifying
witness).
133. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537–38 (stating that cross-examination is neces-
sary to test the “analyst’s honesty, proficiency, and methodology”).  Only cross-
examination of the analyst performing the tests will provide this information.
134. A supervisor testifying to the contents of a lab report in which he played no part
in preparing will be subject to evidentiary objections relating to both lack of first-
hand knowledge and hearsay.  “[I]f the witness’s testimony on its face purports to
describe observed facts, but the testimony rests on statements of others, the ob-
jection is that the witness lacks firsthand knowledge.  In contrast, when on its
face the testimony indicates the witness is repeating out-of-court statements, a
hearsay objection is appropriate.” KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE §10 (6th ed. 2006); see also State v. Belvin, 986 So. 2d 516, 523 (Fla. 2008)
(holding that the testimony of a supervisor of the chemist who actually performed
the tests at issue failed to satisfy confrontation requirements where the supervi-
sor “under cross-examination, could not have answered questions concerning
chain of custody, methods of scientific testing, and analytical procedures regard-
ing the contraband at issue”).
135. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539 (emphasis omitted).
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and now trial courts can be somewhat comfortable overruling confron-
tation objections which demand the appearance of all chain-of-custody
witnesses or those involved in testing equipment maintenance.  Still,
how shall a trial court rule if the defendant demands the testimony of
all four analysts involved in the analysis?136  The Melendez-Diaz
Court made clear that individuals creating a record to be used at trial
to prove a fact necessary for the defendant’s guilt must be presented
for cross-examination.137  In the above scenario, all four analysts par-
ticipated in creating the lab report.  It would appear they all must tes-
tify in order to admit the entirety of the results.  Although requiring a
single analyst to testify in support of a particular lab report would
have only negligible effect on the state’s ability to prosecute,138 requir-
ing all four analysts could prevent the efficient application of
justice.139
B. Resolving the Issue Through Legislative Action
To avoid the inherent problems in requiring the testimony of mul-
tiple analysts, jurisdictions should enact statutory language which
specifically identifies who may testify to the entire contents of the lab
report.  To satisfy Confrontation Clause requirements, this individual
must have directly supervised or participated in all portions of the
analysis, and they must possess adequate knowledge of the methods
and equipment used, as well as the qualifications of others involved in
the analysis.140 Melendez-Diaz does not stand for the proposition that
all analysts involved in the testing of the substance must testify.
Rather, if a record was created in the form of test results, those results
are admissible only if a creator of that record is available for cross-
examination, not all contributors.  If multiple analysts participate in
the same portion of the analysis, there is nothing in Melendez-Diaz
that would prevent the admission of this evidence through the testi-
136. Id. at 2544–46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2537–39 (majority opinion).
138. Id. at 2542.
139. Requiring all analysts involved to testify at trial would likely cause serious de-
lays in the trial process and potentially deny a defendant his right to a speedy
trial.  Brief of Amici Curiae the National District Attorneys Ass’n et al. in Sup-
port of Respondent, supra note 100, at 16.  Further, requiring the analyst to ap-
pear in court will clearly “curtail the amount of time available for analyzing
drugs.” Id.  Requiring two, three, or even four analysts to testify to the contents
of a single lab report only multiplies this effect. See supra notes 132–35 and ac-
companying text.
140. The person testifying must have firsthand knowledge of the methods used in the
analysis and the contents of the report. See FED. R. EVID. 602, 701; see also Paul
C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV.
45, 58 (1993) (noting that the testifying analyst must have “personal knowledge
about issues such as chain of custody and adherence to proper procedures during
the time the subordinate had possession of the evidence”).
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mony of a single participant, provided that participant had firsthand
knowledge of the entire testing process.  In the “Substance Analysis”
scenario above, none of the analysts possess this knowledge, and thus
confrontation will likely require the appearance of all four.141  A prop-
erly drafted statute identifying the particular characteristics of a “tes-
tifying analyst” will not only provide courts with guidance in
determining who must testify, it will also encourage state laboratories
to adopt procedures which create an analyst who has adequate knowl-
edge to testify to all portions of the report.142
The Court’s ultimate holding in Melendez-Diaz was considerable—
a defendant now has a right to confront the analyst who prepared the
report being used as evidence against him.  Although some jurisdic-
tions granted this right prior to Melendez-Diaz, many states allowed
the admission of certified analyst reports without also providing the
defendant with the right to object and demand the presence of the an-
alyst who prepared the report.143  Thus, the Court’s ruling in
Melendez-Diaz will likely result in an increased number of defendants
demanding live testimony.144  In the aftermath of Melendez-Diaz, trial
courts will be scrambling to determine whose testimony will satisfy
confrontation requirements.  The Supreme Court’s “chain-of-custody”
guidance is inadequate.  Moreover, the Court’s holding “offers no prin-
ciples or historical precedent to determine” whose testimony shall be
required to meet Sixth Amendment demands.145  As stated in the dis-
sent, there is “no accepted definition of analyst, and there is no estab-
lished precedent to define the term.”146  While true, nothing would
141. “[A] person who has no knowledge of a fact except what another has told him does
not satisfy the requirement of knowledge from observation.” BROUN, supra note
134, §10.
142. Most tests are performed by a single analyst, and in these situations, that ana-
lyst’s testimony will satisfy confrontation.  Where multiple analysts are involved
in an analysis, the lab should institute procedures which allow for a single par-
ticipant to gain firsthand knowledge of the entire process.
143. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-254 (2009); D.C. CODE § 48-905.06 (Lexis-
Nexis 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-2745 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439 (Reis-
sue 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-515 (LEXIS through Apr. 2010 legislation).
Although some of the aforementioned statutes provide the defendant a right to
subpoena the analyst, Melendez-Diaz makes clear that this is not sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at
2540.
144. Knowing that the prosecution could not prove its case absent the results of the
analysis, defendants may refuse to stipulate to the contents of the lab report and
instead demand live testimony in hopes that the analyst will be unavailable and
the charges will be dismissed.  Brief of Amici Curiae the National District Attor-
neys Ass’n et al. in Support of Respondent, supra note 100, at 19.  On similar
logic, there are fears that defendants will now require the presence of the analyst
before pleading guilty. See id.
145. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2544.
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prevent a state from enacting legislation to resolve this issue.  This
Note proposes that jurisdictions adopt statutory language identifying
a “testifying analyst” who can constitutionally testify to the entire con-
tents of the lab report.147
1. Characteristics of the “Testifying Analyst”
To satisfy the Confrontation Clause, the analyst testifying to the
contents of the lab report must have supervisory authority over other
technicians involved in the testing process,148 if any, and must have
adequate knowledge regarding the testing methods employed,149 the
reliability and effectiveness of the machines utilized,150 and the loca-
tion of the substance through all steps of the testing process.151  Fur-
ther, to possess adequate knowledge for cross-examination152 and to
comply with basic rules of evidence,153 this individual also must have
performed a substantial portion of the analysis.
Practically speaking, requiring testimony from an analyst who per-
formed a substantial portion of the testing and analysis ensures that
the defendant is given an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst’s
147. This provision could be incorporated into a constitutional notice-and-demand
statute or simply included among a state’s other evidentiary statutes.
148. This requirement will help to ensure that the designated analyst has adequate
knowledge of the methods and techniques used during various stages of analysis.
Although many laboratories do not currently employ analysts with such author-
ity, these statutory criteria will encourage labs to adapt their procedures to cre-
ate such a role within the lab. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 222181,
CENSUS OF PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES, 2005, at 2 tbl.2
(2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpffcl05.pdf (reporting
that 58% of crime laboratory employees were analysts or examiners and 13%
were directors or supervisors).
149. “For a report from a crime laboratory to be deemed competent, [the report] should
contain . . . a description of the analytical techniques used in the test . . . .” Sym-
posium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 632 (1984)
(remarks of Professor Anna Harrison, Department of Chemistry, Mount Holyoke
College).  It follows then, for a report to contain the techniques used in the test,
the signer of the report must know the techniques or methods used in the test.
150. In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court stated that maintenance reports are likely
not testimonial and thus can be admitted as prima facie evidence of the condition
of the equipment.   129 S. Ct at 2532 n.1.  Nonetheless, the defendant may still
want to cross-examine regarding the reliability of a particular machine.  The per-
son testifying in court should have adequate knowledge of these facts. Id.
151. As a practical matter, a testifying analyst with knowledge of the chain of custody
of drug being analyzed may serve as a witness for establishing both the contents
of the report and chain of custody of the substance. See, e.g., MAUET, supra note
120, at 183–84 (providing sample testimony).
152. Edward J. Imwinkelried, “This Is Like Déjà Vu All Over Again”: The Third, Con-
stitutional, Attack on the Admissibility of Police Laboratory Reports in Criminal
Cases, 38 N.M. L. REV. 303, 326–27 (2008).
153. See FED. R. EVID. 602, 701.
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“techniques, procedures, and handling of the contraband.”154  Requir-
ing this testimony also allows the defendant to question the analyst’s
proficiency, experience, and training in interpreting particular test re-
sults.  In fact, demonstrating that an analyst lacks the necessary ex-
pertise is a “well-accepted method of challenging the weight of the
[analyst’s] testimony.”155  In Melendez-Diaz, Massachusetts argued
that the analyst reports at issue did not pose confrontation issues be-
cause the results were mechanically produced by a testing instru-
ment.156  In a subsequent footnote, however, Massachusetts admitted
that these machine-generated data must ordinarily be interpreted by
an analyst.157  In interpreting these data, the analyst must rely on
“personal, subjective standards to draw the inference.”158  It is for pre-
cisely this reason that only the testimony of an individual who per-
formed a substantial portion of the analysis will satisfy confrontation
requirements.  Only the analyst interpreting the results will be able to
respond accurately to questions regarding the subjective standards
used in forming their conclusions.  This logic prevents the live testi-
mony of a supervisor or testifying expert—essentially surrogate testi-
mony—from meeting the stringent requirements of the Confrontation
Clause.
2. Surrogate Testimony Will Not Satisfy Confrontation
An amicus brief supporting Melendez-Diaz suggested that in cases
where the actual analyst was unavailable, a surrogate analyst could
testify in his or her place.159  This alternative poses numerous
problems.  First, allowing a supervisor or trial expert to testify would
prevent the defendant from exposing the analyst’s weak creden-
154. Rivera v. State, 917 So. 2d 210, 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); see also Paul C.
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Relia-
bility of Scientific Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 688–95 (1988) (discussing various
problems with the reliability of lab testing and lab reports and providing numer-
ous examples of deficiencies in crime lab analysis that could be brought out dur-
ing cross-examination).
155. Imwinkelried, supra note 152, at 325.
156. Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 10 (“[D]rug analysis certificates do not
accuse anyone of anything criminal; instead, they merely establish the current
physical composition and weight of a chemical substance.  These neutral, objec-
tive facts become inculpatory only when a testifying witness, who is properly sub-
ject to confrontation, provides the necessary evidentiary links to connect the
substance tested in the laboratory to the accused’s past criminal conduct.”).
157. Id. at 30 n.10.
158. Imwinkelried, supra note 152, at 327.
159. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20, Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 2521264 at
*20; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent at 25, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 4195142 at *25
(suggesting that Federal Rule of Evidence 703 permits expert analysts to testify
to the contents of reports generated by other technicians).
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tials.160  Despite the “expert” designation, many forensic analysts re-
ceive very little substantive training.161  It would be difficult to expose
the extent of an analyst’s education and training deficiencies through
the cross-examination of a surrogate who can testify only to his own
educational background.  Permitting a supervisor or other designated
witness to testify in place of the analyst who actually performed the
tests will allow the prosecution to screen the lesser qualified chemist
from cross-examination by substituting his testimony with that of a
professional witness possessing both trial experience and stronger
credentials.162
Further, a surrogate will not be able to respond adequately to ques-
tions regarding the methods and techniques used during the analysis
in question.163  The Confrontation Clause is satisfied only when the
defendant is given ample opportunity to “probe and expose . . .
through cross-examination.”164 An illustrative case on this point is
Delaware v. Fensterer, where on cross-examination the analyst admit-
ted he could not remember which method was used in performing the
analysis.165  Had the findings been introduced through a surrogate,
there would have been no opportunity to expose this infirmity.  Al-
though a testifying expert may be able to explain the methods that
should have been utilized, unless this expert directly supervised the
160. An article on drug testing describes the cross-examination of a drug expert with
forty-three years of experience and more than 2500 court appearances as follows:
[The expert] admitted that not only did he not have a college degree, but
that he had never even finished high school.  He claimed that heroin was
an alkaloid, which it is, but did not remember what an alkaloid was.  He
could not draw the structure of heroin or benzene, one of the commonest
and simplest organic molecules. . . .  In addition, he could not explain any
single chemical reaction about which he had testified.
Bruce Stein et al., An Evaluation of Drug Testing Procedures Used by Forensic
Laboratories and the Qualifications of Their Analysts, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 727, 728;
see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (“Like expert witnesses generally, an
analyst’s lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in
cross-examination.”).
161. Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An “Intellec-
tually Honest” Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 299, 411 (2007).
162. See Giannelli, supra note 140, at 58–59 (providing an example where a well-
trained toxicologist substitutes for lesser qualified subordinates and misleads the
jury into thinking that he actually performed the tests).
163. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (noting that some “methodology requires
the exercise of judgment and presents a risk of error that might be explored on
cross-examination”); see also State v. Navarro, 621 A.2d 408, 412 (Me. 1993)
(“[T]he State has the burden of producing a witness who can testify as to the
analysis procedures and results.”).
164. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985).
165. Id. at 20.  It is interesting to note, however, that the Court concluded that the
analyst’s lack of memory did not “frustrate any opportunity for cross-examination
[so] that admission of the witness’ direct testimony violates the Confrontation
Clause.” Id.  The Confrontation Clause was satisfied as long as the defendant
had the ability to expose the analyst’s lack of memory. Id. at 22.
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analysis, she would be unable to verify whether proper techniques
were indeed employed.  It is important to note that in larger labs, a
credentialed toxicologist may “supervise” fifty cases a day.166  Such
oversight does not meet the level of “direct supervision” necessary to
permit the supervisor to testify to the contents of the report.
Although a true surrogate analyst would fail to satisfy the de-
mands of the Confrontation Clause, this would not prevent a lab from
designating a “testifying analyst,” assuming this individual is suffi-
ciently cross-examinable regarding the analysis of the substance.167
Statutory language identifying the necessary qualifications of this
“testifying analyst” would provide guidance to both trial court judges
and state laboratories.  Unfortunately, there are currently no model
statutes available which contain the criteria proposed by this Note,
but, as discussed below, Ohio’s notice-and-demand statute168 is help-
ful in supplying relevant language that could be used in developing a
provision defining a “testifying analyst.”  Ultimately, however, the
statute fails to clearly identify a single analyst whose testimony would
satisfy confrontation requirements.  Thus, although the Ohio statute
provides an excellent framework, jurisdictions must also incorporate
the criteria identified in subsection III.B.1.
3. Examination of Identifying Language in Ohio Notice-and-
Demand Statute
The Ohio statute requires the certificate of analysis to be “signed
by the person performing the analysis . . . stating that the substances
. . . have been weighed and analyzed.”169  Further, the statute re-
quires the signer to “attest that scientifically accepted tests were per-
formed with due caution, and that the evidence was handled in
accordance with established and accepted procedures while in the cus-
tody of the laboratory.”170  The demand portion of this statute allows
the defendant the opportunity to “demand the testimony of the person
signing the report.”171
In Ohio, when a defendant demands live testimony, the prosecu-
tion must provide the person who performed the analysis and who can
testify to both the scientific standards of the tests performed and to
whether the evidence was handled “in accordance with established
166. Giannelli, supra note 140, at 57.
167. See FED. R. EVID. 602, 701; see also BROUN, supra note 134, §10 (“However, when
the witness bases his testimony partly upon firsthand knowledge and partly upon
the accounts of others, the problem calls for a practical compromise.”).
168. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006).
169. Id. § 2925.51(A).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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and accepted procedures.”172  This means the Ohio statute function-
ally narrows the field of lab employees who can testify.  Only a techni-
cian who both performed the analysis and had knowledge of the
methods and procedures used by the lab can testify.  However, the
Ohio statute fails to completely resolve the issue highlighted in the
“Substance Analysis” scenario discussed in section III.A. above: What
if the substance was weighed by one person and analyzed by another?
Must they both testify?
The Ohio statute requires that the person performing the analysis
must sign the report173 and must testify to its contents if the defen-
dant makes a timely demand.174  When multiple analysts are in-
volved, the statute appears to require the production of several
distinct reports and the live testimony of every analyst involved in
order to admit the results of a single analysis.  Although this require-
ment is unlikely to result in the end of all drug prosecutions, it could
lead to unnecessary testimony and abuse by defense attorneys.175
It is difficult to ascertain from the statute itself whether the Ohio
legislature intended each person performing the analysis to sign the
report176 or whether it intended a supervising analyst to sign the re-
port on behalf of all those involved in the process.177   A better ap-
proach would be to eliminate this ambiguity altogether by using the
criteria discussed in subsection III.B.1 above to statutorily identify a
single person within the lab who both participated in a substantial




174. Id. § 2925.51(C).
175. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2557 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (“The defense bar today gains the formidable power to require the gov-
ernment to transport the analyst to the courtroom at the time of trial.  Zealous
counsel will insist upon concessions: a plea bargain, or a more lenient sentence in
exchange for relinquishing this remarkable power.”).
176. If each person performing portions of the analysis must testify, this could lead to
the dire consequences described by the dissent in Melendez-Diaz. Id. at 2544–45
(majority opinion).
177. Ohio has not yet addressed the issue of whether a supervisor’s testimony will
satisfy confrontation.  However, other jurisdictions have ruled in the negative.
See Rivera v. State, 917 So. 2d 210, 211–12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding the
testimony of the supervisor of the chemist who tested the substance and wrote
the report to be insufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause for admission of
the findings in the report); see also People v. Williams, 183 P.3d 577, 579 (Colo.
App. 2007) (holding that a laboratory report cannot be admitted through the tes-
timony of the supervisor where the supervisor had played no part in the testing of
the substance and, further, rejecting the prosecution’s assertion that it had no
obligation to provide the actual employee performing the analyst where the de-
fendant’s written demand requested the testimony of “any technician or
employee”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Melendez-Diaz the Supreme Court properly concluded that ana-
lyst reports are testimonial under the Crawford standard and are
therefore inadmissible as evidence against the accused, unless the de-
fendant is afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst pre-
paring the report.  Preparing reports with the sole purpose of
establishing facts necessary to prove the defendant’s guilt at trial—
created at law enforcement’s request—is precisely the kind of practice
the Sixth Amendment was intended to prohibit.
The Court ruled that when the defendant makes a proper demand,
the prosecution must present live testimony in order to admit the con-
tents of the report into evidence.  The Court noted that not all those
involved in the analysis must testify in order to admit the results.
Specifically, the Court found that those involved in the chain of cus-
tody and in the maintenance of the testing equipment need not testify
to satisfy confrontation requirements.  The Court did not identify,
however, who specifically must testify in order to admit the entire con-
tents of the report.  The Court’s ruling left open the possibility that
several analysts may have to testify in order to admit the results of a
single forensic analysis.
In order to resolve this issue, jurisdictions should adopt legislation
identifying the particular characteristics of a single analyst whose tes-
timony would meet the demands of the Sixth Amendment.  In order to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause, the testifying analyst must be suffi-
ciently cross-examinable.  To achieve this, the analyst should possess
ample knowledge of the testing procedures used and the reliability of
the methods employed, and the analyst must have participated in a
substantial portion of the analysis.  Evidentiary statutes and case law
reject the notion that the testimony of a lab supervisor is sufficient to
satisfy confrontation.  Only an analyst who took part in the analysis
will possess the knowledge necessary to allow the defendant to suffi-
ciently cross-examine the witness against him.
Hundreds of thousands of drug, DNA, and blood tests are per-
formed by crime labs every year.178  Many of the current testing pro-
cedures used by these labs involve multiple analysts testing a single
substance.179  Under Melendez-Diaz, the testimony of all analysts in-
volved in the test may be required to admit the results.  States can
either wait patiently for the Supreme Court to identify a single ana-
lyst who can satisfy confrontation requirements, or they can take im-
mediate legislative action.  This Note proposes the latter.
178. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 148, at 3 & tbl. 6.
179. Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 15 (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.
php?record_id=12589&page=15 (discussing the “extreme disaggregation” of fo-
rensic science practitioners).
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